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Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
and Efficient Accident Law  
§ 1. Introduction 
In the economic analysis of law, the advantages of liability insurance have been 
extensively discussed. Liability insurance is considered as the optimal instrument to 
remedy the risk aversion of the injurer without increasing the size of the expected 
losses. Thanks to the control devices used by the insurer, it can be guaranteed that the 
injurer, although insured, will still have appropriate incentives for taking care. It has 
been argued also that these benefits of liability insurance only apply when there is 
sufficient competition on insurance markets.1 In spite of the latter warning, one notices 
increasing co-operation between insurance companies, especially as far as larger risks 
are concerned. Professional organizations, such as associations of insurers, provide 
either so-called market advices to the affiliated insurance companies or outright 
standard policy forms that can be used by the members. These forms of co-operation 
may obviously limit competition between insurance companies.  
The co-operation between insurance companies can take different forms, as the 
following examples from the Dutch market illustrate. In the second half of the 1990s, 
the Dutch insurers’ association formulated the advice to change the coverage for 
employers’ liability from loss occurrence to claims made coverage, especially for so-
called occupational diseases. As a consequence, an individual employer will no longer 
have the possibility to obtain coverage for occupational diseases on a loss occurrence 
basis in the Netherlands. Another example is that in the same country, the insurers 
agreed in the 1950s that for some risks considered to be catastrophic (more particularly 
 
 
1. This paper draws on earlier research. See M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh, ‘Restrictions of competition 
on insurance market and the applicability of EC anti trust law’, 48 Kyklos 1 (1995), 65-85 and M. 
Faure and R. Van den Bergh, ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering, concurrentie en ongevallenpreventie’, in 
T. Hartlief and M.M. Mendel (eds.), Verzekering en maatschappij, (Kluwer, 2000), 315-342. 
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earthquakes and floods) no insurer was allowed to provide coverage. The latter example 
shows that these practices not only limit competition, but equally limit the availability 
of insurance coverage. Indeed, in some cases it can be doubted that these particular risks 
(for instance floods) are indeed uninsurable from a technical insurance perspective.  
The question arises whether limitations of competition on insurance markets can be 
economically justified. We will address this question by taking a look at the way 
European competition law deals with restrictive practices and provide a critical 
perspective of that approach. The focus will mainly be on liability insurance for the 
following reason. Many scholars hold that the scope of liability itself should be linked 
to the availability of insurance. It can be argued that the availability of insurance may 
only be increased if insurers are allowed to share information, for instance statistics on 
risks or information concerning the optimal preventive mechanisms. On the one hand, 
an exchange of information may thus be necessary to increase insurability. On the other 
hand, such an exchange provides the framework for limitations of competition. It should 
be clear from the outset that it is very difficult to discuss a co-operation between 
insurers in black or white statements. It is not always easy to make a distinction 
between desirable and useful co-operation between insurers, which increases the 
availability of insurance, and damaging restrictive practices. 
This paper is set up as follows: first it is explained why competition law is a crucial 
instrument to support an efficient accident law (2). Then the question is addressed to 
what extent competition law should be applied to the insurance world. This question is 
partially answered by the European Commission in its Regulation 3932/92 of 21 
December 19922 which provides a block exemption for insurance companies from the 
cartel prohibition (3). The conditions for the exemption will then be critically discussed 
(4) and it will be shown that restrictions of competition may endanger some of the 
efficiency goals of liability law (5). Finally attention is given to the Report of the 
European Commission to the Parliament of 12 May 19993 concerning the application of 
the mentioned exemption (6) and a few concluding remarks are formulated (7).  
§ 2. Competition Law as an Instrument to support an efficient Accident 
Law 
The central idea of the economic analysis of accident law is that the foresight of being 
held liable ex post will give potential injurers ex ante an incentive for taking efficient 
care and choosing an optimal activity level. In case of full insurance coverage, these 
incentives are, however, no longer given by liability law, since the threat to have to 
 
 
2. [1992] O.J. L398/7. 
3. Report of the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council of 12 May 1999 concerning 
the operation of Exemption Regulation 3932/92, COM(1999) 92 final. 
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compensate the victim in case of liability is shifted to the insurer. The incentives for 
prevention must therefore be provided by the policy conditions of the insurance. If the 
insurer can optimally control the risk of moral hazard through a policy that reflects the 
behaviour of the insured, this can lead to a behaviour of the insured as if there were no 
insurance coverage. Hence, liability insurance has a very important social function: it 
must guarantee that the control by the insurer of the behaviour of the insured injurer will 
provide the latter with sufficient incentives for the prevention of accidents. 
In the ideal situation the policy conditions will optimally align to the individual risk 
posed by the insured. As far as possible, this means that the premium will be adapted to 
the individual risk posed by the insured, as a result of which the insured will have 
optimal incentives for the reduction of risk. The key notions here are risk differentiation 
and risk classification.4 How can competition contribute to an optimal risk 
differentiation? Competition should increase the likelihood that the premiums charged 
align with the actuarially fair premiums. The actuarially fair premium corresponds with 
the probability of the damage multiplied by the expected magnitude of the damage. 
When an insurance market is sufficiently competitive, insurers will compete to reduce 
administrative costs and profits. The result will be that the difference between the price 
charged for the insurance and the actuarially fair premium (the size of the losses 
multiplied by the probability of their occurrence) will not be too large. In other words: 
the process of competition guarantees that actual premiums charged will correspond as 
much as possible with actuarially fair premiums and may avoid insurance companies 
making inefficiently high profits (implying that they can charge premiums that largely 
exceed the actuarially fair premiums).  
On insurance markets, prices (premiums) will be fixed as a result of supply and 
demand. When demand for insurance products increases (for instance as a result of the 
introduction of compulsory insurance), in principle the supply of insurance can be 
increased without the necessity to increase premiums.5 In other words: in case of an 
increased demand there should in principle not be premium increases. Premium 
increases should only occur when the actuarially fair premium (the probability 
multiplied by the expected damage) increases.  
Not only does the competitive process avoid the creation of inefficient profits; it can 
also guarantee that the actuarially fair premium is fixed correctly. As long as the 
premium correctly reflects the risk, moral hazard will be cured optimally, implying that 
 
 
4. See on the optimal method of risk differentiation: Borenstein, ‘The economics of costly risk sorting in 
competitive insurance markets’, 9 International Review of Law and Economics (1989), 25-39 and see 
also W.P.J. Wils, ‘Insurance risk classifications in the EC: regulatory outlook’, 14 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (1994), 449-467. 
5. See H.E. Frech and J. Samprone, ‘The welfare loss of excess non price competition: the case of 
property liability insurance regulation’, 23 Journal of Law and Economics 2 (1980), 429-440. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
282 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
injurers will not have an incentive to increase their activity level or to decrease their 
level of care simply because they are insured. This first best solution can of course only 
be realized in an ideal world where insurance companies can optimally observe the 
insured and where moral hazard can be controlled optimally. Here again, the 
competitive process can play an important role: insurers should compete with each other 
concerning the way in which higher care by the insured will be rewarded with a 
premium reduction. In other words: the competitive process can help the control of 
moral hazard. The competitive process is therefore important to guarantee that an 
insurer rewards the insured for increased care with a premium decrease. Thus risk 
differentiation, the key element to control moral hazard, can only be guaranteed on 
competitive insurance markets. In the absence of competition, insurers will have too 
little incentive to control moral hazard optimally.  
The conclusion so far is therefore relatively simple: in order to have an optimally 
functioning liability insurance, it seems important to apply competition law also to the 
insurance market. However, this conclusion does not seem obvious in the insurance 
world, where it has been often argued that competition law should not unequivocally be 
applied to insurance markets. In the following section, we will discuss the arguments 
that have been advanced in that respect and evaluate them critically. 
§ 3. The Application of Competition Law to Insurance  
A. THE ARGUMENTS 
Insurers have advanced several arguments to support the conclusion that insurance is 
clearly different from other services and should therefore be exempted from the 
application of competition law. Usually five arguments are advanced to justify the 
exemption of the insurance companies from the scope of the competition rules: 
1. Co-operation between insurance companies is necessary to make premium 
calculation possible (premium calculation argument). 
2. Since insurance risks tend to become larger, pooling of risks and reinsurance 
becomes indispensable; this tendency would preclude the applicability of 
competition law (reinsurance argument). 
3. Due to the lack of market transparency consumers are unable to compare different 
insurance policies; these information problems require regulation instead of 
enforcement of competition rules (market transparency argument). 
4. Since the provision of insurance coverage is not dependent upon production costs 
insurers could extend their capacity without limits; this would cause a tendency 
towards ruinous price competition in insurance markets (capacity argument). 
5. Competition may lead to bankruptcies, which would make it impossible for the 
insurance companies to fulfil their obligations vis-à-vis the insured; the latter have to 
be protected against this insolvency risk (insolvency argument). 
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None of these arguments is, however, sufficient to justify granting the insurance sector a 
general exemption from the prohibition of cartel agreements.6 Let us discuss each of the 
arguments in turn. 
B. PREMIUM CALCULATION ARGUMENT 
One of the main arguments used by the insurance industry to justify the exemption from 
the competition rules relates to the difficulties concerning the calculation of premiums. 
It is argued that the loss statistics which individual companies possess fall a long way 
short of what is needed for the proper rating of risks. Co-operation between insurance 
companies is therefore necessary. After a collective analysis of loss statistics practical 
guidance for the writing of policies can be obtained. This kind of co-operation would 
make the calculation of the necessary technical reserves possible and ensure that income 
and expenses balance so that there is no risk of insolvency. Hence, the argument goes 
that co-operation with respect to premium calculation contributes to an improvement of 
the provision of services and therefore meets the first condition for an exemption.  
At first sight the argument seems correct. First, the insurer’s risk premium is a function 
of large numbers. The insurance industry may be ‘naturally monopolistic’. The 
technology of production may be such that larger firms can produce at lower unit cost 
over all relevant output levels. Second, the peculiarity of the business of insurance 
undertakings lies in uncertainty. To determine the precise cost of the claims and thus to 
be able to calculate the premium the insurer has to rely on forecasts concerning the 
probability of the insured event and the foreseeable extent of the loss. The assessment of 
the frequency and the extent of claims implies access to meaningful statistics. 
Co-operation would therefore be necessary to provide information which is sufficiently 
general to enable the calculation of average values, which have to be known to fix the 
premiums. Especially if claims are relatively infrequent and risk categories are 
relatively numerous, then the larger the firm, the better the actuarial calculations based 
on internal claims experience. There is a clear incentive for firms either to merge or to 
co-operate in the pooling of claims experience. The premium calculation argument is an 
example of the public good nature of information: once one firm has a claim, that fact 
can be made available to all other firms at very low cost. Hence, the applicability of 
competition rules should not hinder an appropriate calculation of tariffs in the insurance 
sector. 
However, there are at least four problems with the premium calculation argument. First, 
it should be noted that insurers are of course not the only producers of services that have 
to deal with uncertainty. The uncertainty which is in this case related to necessary 
information for premium calculation is a normal business risk of an entrepreneur and 
 
 
6. This analysis is partially based on M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh, 48 Kyklos 1 (1995), 65-85. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
284 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
does not in itself justify the existence of cartels. Second, the premium calculation 
argument is formulated in terms which are far too general, without distinguishing 
between different classes of insurance. Möschel distinguishes with good reason between 
‘Zufallsrisiken’ (risks determined by coincidence) and ‘Anderungsrisiken’ (risks 
relating to a change in the dangerous situation itself). The former can be calculated on 
the basis of the law of the big numbers. In many classes of insurance the necessary 
figures can be obtained without difficulty. The production of mortality tables does not 
require co-operation since the life expectancies of people are widely known for several 
years and are not subject to important changes. Information is also readily available as 
far as the frequency of illnesses and accidents are concerned. Difficulties do arise in the 
determination of industrial risks (e.g. fire and operational failure) but these are mainly 
due to the long duration of the insurance contracts.7 Hence, the setting of minimum 
premiums for life insurance on the basis of a limited list of mortality tables and an 
obligatory inventory supplement and the practice of long term contracts in fire 
insurance merely indicate the desire of the insurance companies to limit competition. 
Third, uncertainties regarding the calculation of risks can be overcome by instruments 
other than cartel agreements. A good example can be found in the field of liability 
insurance. Assume that an insured would wish to change insurance companies. After a 
relatively long contract period the insurance company could have a relatively good view 
of the individual risk of the insured, based among others on the number of accidents in 
the past. This information could be made available to the insured, e.g., by giving him a 
personal certificate or register with his personal record with this insurance company. It 
becomes then easier for the insured to change insurance companies without having to 
start at the highest premium for beginners with his new insurance company. This 
example illustrates that if insurers are willing to think along these lines, many 
instruments can be developed to pass on information on risks that even promote 
competition instead of limiting it by making cartel agreements on premiums. Finally, 
the public good argument requires that the information on loss statistics is made widely 
available. The key issue to ask is who has access to this information. An insurance 
cartel will not be inclined to make the statistical studies results available to outsiders. It 
would be a superior outcome to force the cartel to provide the competition authorities 
with this information, which could then publish the loss statistics and make them known 
to competitors and consumers. As long as this information is not passed on to new 
entrants, co-operation with respect to premium calculation may give market power to 
the incumbent firms and artificial entry barriers may be created. 
The EC Commission could of course reply that Article 3 of Regulation No. 3932/928 
clearly states under (a) that the exchange of information is limited to data that are 
 
 
7. W. Möschel, ‘§ 102 GWB’, in U. Immenga and E.J. Mestmäcker (eds.), GWB. Kommentar zum 
Kartellgesetz, (Beck, 1981), 20-24. See also J. Finsinger, Verbraucherschutz auf 
Versicherungsmärkten, (Florentz, 1988), 60-62. 
8. [1992] O.J. L398/7. 
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neutral with respect to competition and that the calculations are established and 
distributed only by way of indicative reference. In Consideration 6 the Commission also 
emphasizes that the exemption only applies to indicative pure premiums. The concerted 
practices on commercial premiums, i.e. the premiums actually charged to policy holders 
and comprising a loading to cover administrative, commercial and other costs, a loading 
for contingencies or profit margins, are not exempted. The difference between the pure 
premiums and the commercial premiums are indeed the administrative, commercial and 
other costs and the profit margins. These may differ considerably between insurance 
companies. However, this argument is not convincing. First, one should note that 
important differences exist as far as risk calculation is concerned between various 
insurance sectors. It would be more useful therefore to differentiate between those 
sectors instead of granting a block exemption from the cartel prohibition. Individual 
exemptions are a better alternative to cover the limited range of situations where 
information exchange between insurers is indispensable to make premium calculation 
possible. Second, it should be noted that within the not yet fully integrated European 
insurance market, premium calculation is still mainly done on a national basis. The 
problem with the block exemption is that it allows these national principles of risk 
calculation to remain in existence, which makes it impossible for an insurance company 
with international activities to compose homogeneous risk groups across country 
borders.9 A generalized exemption from the cartel prohibition therefore has adverse 
effects as far as the achievement of an internal European insurance market is concerned. 
Third, there is only a thin line between the so-called indicative premiums and real 
horizontal price agreements. A cartel authority should know that recommended prices 
are often used as a substitute for fixed prices (e.g. vertical price fixing) and therefore 
require intensive control. The European Commission would do better to listen to a piece 
of good advice from Adam Smith, who wrote as early as 1776: 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or 
in some contrivance to raise prices...But though the law cannot hinder 
people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to 
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies…10 
By allowing indicative premiums which ‘have only reference value’11 the European 
Commission is effectively sending invitations to insurers, suggesting meetings where 
cartel agreements can be reached. When insurers during a conference discuss frequency 
tables and circumstances that may influence the number or size of claims they may find 
 
 
9. See R. Eisen, W. Müller and P. Zweifel, ‘Entrepreneurial Insurance. A New Paradigm for Deregulated 
Markets’, 18 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 66 (1993), 1-56 
10. Th. A. Smith, An inquiry into the nature and the causes of the wealth of nations, (1937), 127-128. 
11  See Consideration 6 of Regulation 3932/92, [1992] O.J. L398/7. 
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it hard to resist the temptation to make some general agreements on commercial 
premiums during the coffee-break as well. 
C. REINSURANCE ARGUMENT 
This argument holds that co-operation in the form of co-insurance and reinsurance is 
necessary to meet the needs of the modern insurance markets, where insurers are 
increasingly asked to cover risks of a magnitude exceeding the assets of an individual 
insurance undertaking. It must be admitted that there are natural reasons which lead 
towards co-operation or merger in the insurance market. The reinsurance argument 
restates the fact that several aspects of the insurance business may be characterized as 
naturally monopolistic. As has already been stated above, the insurer’s risk premium 
itself is a function of large numbers: the more independent risks covered, the more 
diversified the portfolio, the lower the fair premium. Both the frequency of claims and 
the diversifiability of risks may make some classes of insurance naturally monopolistic. 
If insurers are faced with risk which is not diversifiable internally, they may either 
diversify through merger, or co-operate with other insurers in a reinsurance 
arrangement. Although the reinsurance argument thus has some merit, it should be 
stressed that not all classes of insurance are naturally monopolistic: it all depends on the 
frequency of claims and the diversifiability of risks. Consequently a blanket exemption 
from antitrust provisions across all classes of insurance may not be optimal. 
Pooling arrangements and arrangements which make reinsurance on a larger scale 
possible might contribute to an increased level of competition. In high risk lines, 
certainly for catastrophic risks, pools permit small insurance companies to participate in 
a particular market.12 If these arrangements were absent, only a few large insurance 
companies would be able to provide insurance coverage for specialized and risky 
activities. Allowing smaller firms to pool will in fact increase the number of 
competitors. Co-insurance should therefore not as such be regarded as a restriction of 
competition. Pooling might also facilitate the purchase of reinsurance. With reinsurance 
the capacity to insure will increase. The ceding insurer will also be protected against 
accumulation of losses arising out of catastrophic occurrences, which helps to stabilize 
operating results.13 The same line of reasoning goes for pooling arrangements on the 
reinsurance market. As a result, the insurance market could become more competitive 
through reinsurance arrangements. However, if pooling and reinsurance arrangements 
are combined with further restrictions, which are not necessitated by insurance technical 
reasons, the final users will not receive a fair share of the resulting benefits and 
inefficiencies might appear. Examples of such cases of inefficient reinsurance can be 
 
 
12. See Havens and R.M. Theisen, ‘The application of United States and EEC Antitrust Laws to 
Reinsurance and Insurance Pooling Arrangements’, The Antitrust Bulletin (1986), 1300-1301; J. 
Finsinger, Verbraucherschutz auf Versicherungsmärkten, 70-72. 
13. Havens and R.M. Theisen, The Antitrust Bulletin (1986), 1300-1301. 
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found in the nuclear insurance industry: pooling of risks in so-called national nuclear 
insurance pools leads to high premiums, a low availability of insurance capacity and 
low financial limits on the liability of the licensee of a nuclear power plant as a result of 
the lobbying power of the nuclear insurance pool and the nuclear industry.14 
Hence, the question arises as to where to set the bottom line of the restrictions from an 
antitrust policy. According to the insurers, restrictions on price competition (premiums) 
are a part of the acceptable limitations. However, horizontal price restraints may hinder 
the passing on of the benefits realized through the accepted restrictions, to the 
consumers of insurance. The argument that uniformity of premiums and policy 
conditions is required to make the calculation of the tariffs for reinsurance possible is 
very weak.15 In this respect the European Commission is indeed quite careful. Article 11 
of Regulation 3932/92 provides that the exemption only applies if the insurance 
products underwritten by the participating undertakings do not represent more than 10% 
of the market in case of co-insurance or 15% of the market in case of co-reinsurance. 
D. MARKET TRANSPARENCY ARGUMENT 
It is often argued, also to justify the exemption, that the supply of insurance services 
lacks transparency so that consumers are unable to compare insurance policies offered 
by competing insurers. The policy terms are sometimes described as ‘hermetic’.16 
Information deficiencies do indeed hinder the functioning of the market mechanism and 
can lead to inefficient results. Regulation would therefore be warranted. The 
standardization of policy terms would thus be the correct regulatory answer to an 
alleged market failure. 
In absolute terms this argument is erroneous both in its formulation and in the proposed 
remedy. The assertion that consumers of insurance services are always incapable of 
evaluating the contents of insurance contracts is as such too general. This may be true as 
far as some clauses in mass insurances are concerned. For instance, policies containing 
sharply formulated exclusions, of which the exact implications can only be assessed by 
a specialized lawyer, might be difficult to read for an average consumer. By contrast, in 
the area of industrial and commercial insurance, insurers are confronted with 
well-informed buyers who appear to be tough bargainers, as the current policy terms 
and premiums for these types of insurance show. Again, one also has to distinguish 
between different classes of insurance to check the veracity of this market transparency 
 
 
14. For example, it is remarkable that on the nuclear insurance market the nuclear pools insure the nuclear 
power plant itself for much higher amounts than the third party liability of the licensee (for a critical 
analysis see M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh ‘Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium from an 
interest group perspective’, 10 International Review of Law and Economics 1 (1990), 241-254). 
15. According to J. Finsinger, Verbraucherschutz auf Versicherungsmärkten, 71-72. 
16. See further J. Finsinger, Ibid., 71-72. 
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argument. Even though there may be serious information problems in the field of mass 
insurance, this market failure does not, however, automatically imply that direct 
regulation of policy conditions is the most appropriate solution.17 Where market 
imperfections exist one should first look for market oriented remedies. Only if the flow 
of information cannot be improved should direct regulation of policy terms be 
considered. There are, however, many possibilities to increase the availability of 
information regarding the extent of insurance coverage to non-commercial buyers. 
In this respect the role of insurance brokers should be emphasized. A competitive 
supply of insurance brokers could assist the consumer in finding an insurance policy 
that fits his preference as far as premium and policy conditions are concerned. 
Standardization of policy conditions has the disadvantage that it does not allow for 
enough risk differentiation and makes it difficult to take into account the individual risk 
of the insured. 
In some countries there is also experience with a control of policy conditions ex post 
through courts or through an independent authority which shows that many possibilities 
to protect consumers against unreasonable policy conditions exist which can still 
guarantee competition between insurance companies. These ex post controls can do a 
better job as far as consumer protection is concerned since they still allow for a variety 
of policies to be supplied on the market and for competition between insurers. 
Again the European Commission seems to have seen the problem. In Consideration 7 of 
Regulation 3932/92 it is argued that standard policy conditions have the advantage of 
improving the comparability of cover for the consumer. However, the Commission 
argues that the exemption should only apply if the standard policy conditions are not 
binding, but serve as non-binding models. Therefore Article 6, 1(a) also stipulates that 
the standard policy conditions can be established and distributed explicitly only by way 
of indicative reference. This implies that the Commission believes that antitrust law is 
not a useful instrument to guarantee the transparency of policy conditions. In that 
respect civil law remedies against unfair policy conditions can do a better job. The 
Regulation now in fact provides for an invasion of antitrust law in the civil law of 
obligations. This is clear in Article 7 of the Regulation which especially provides for a 
long list of prohibited (black list) clauses which may not be contained in the standard 
policy conditions if the insurers want the exemption to apply. 
 
 
17. R. Eisen, W. Müller and P. Zweifel, ‘Entrepreneurial Insurance. A New Paradigm for Deregulated 
Markets’, 18 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 66 (1993), 17-18.  
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E. CAPACITY ARGUMENT 
This argument holds that insurance markets show a tendency towards ‘ruinous price 
competition’, because insurers can extend their capacity without limits. Unlimited 
competition in the insurance industry would result in the excessive risk of some 
insurance companies going out of business in view of the special characteristics of the 
supply of insurance services, being largely independent of production costs. 
Competition on prices would therefore be particularly keen and, if it were unlimited, 
cause many bankruptcies. 
The capacity argument is not supported by convincing theoretical or empirical proof. It 
should be obvious that supply is not unlimited as regards quantity. The administrative 
costs of insurance amount to one third of the awarded damages. It is, moreover, 
necessary to increase reserves in relation to capacity in order to guarantee the 
performance of insurance contracts. Possibilities to extend the supply are also in many 
classes of insurance restricted by the limited number of insurable objects: for instance, 
in the cases of industrial fire insurance, insurance against operational failure and motor 
vehicle insurance. Furthermore, the availability of reinsurance protects against ruinous 
competition.18 Finsinger has drawn attention to the fact that a tendency towards ruinous 
competition would only prevail if economies of scale in the production of insurance 
were important. This may be the case from a theoretical point of view (the law of the 
large numbers) but in practice economies of scale are also realized by small insurance 
companies so that larger rivals have no significant advantages related to their size. Risks 
are above all determined by the correlated stochastic components of the insured risks 
and the general business risk.19 The risk is not a priori dependent upon the size of the 
enterprise. From an empirical point of view the low degree of concentration and the 
small number of bankruptcies in non-regulated insurance markets (e.g., Great Britain) 
also rebuts the capacity argument.20 
Finally, the desirability of exempting the insurance industry from the scope of 
competition rules on the basis of the capacity argument is incomplete unless existing 
government regulation is taken into account. The option to increase capacity is limited 
in many Member States by requiring solvency margins and minimum guarantee funds. 
The capacity argument is therefore not a convincing reason to generally exclude cartel 
agreements in the insurance sector from the cartel prohibition. 
 
 
18. J. Finsinger, European Integration of Insurance Markets. Preliminary but novel perspectives, Working 
Paper Universität Lüneburg Nr. 75, (1989), 70-72. 
19. J. Finsinger, Ibid., 59-60.; R. Eisen, W. Müller and P. Zweifel, ‘Entrepreneurial Insurance. A New 
Paradigm for Deregulated Markets’, 18 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 66 (1993), 23-24. 
20. J. Finsinger, E. Hammond and J. Tapp, Insurance: competition or regulation? A comparative study of 
the insurance markets in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, 1985), 169. 
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F. INSOLVENCY ARGUMENT 
This argument is based on the consumer protection idea: regulation of the insurance 
sector is necessary to protect the ‘innocent’ insured against the risk of insolvency of his 
insurer. In this respect it should of course be stressed that free competition implies that 
unprofitable undertakings go out of business. On the other hand, in the event of the 
insurers’ insolvency the insured remain uncompensated and the costs of their claims are 
thrown upon society. A balance must therefore be found between the requirements of 
the normal operation of competition and those of the public interest which demand that 
a contract of insurance must always be honoured.21 
This argument is also flawed. If, as a policy matter, one accepts that the contractual 
obligations of an insurer should always be honoured, this could be guaranteed through 
means other than cartel agreements. In this respect one can point at specific institutions 
which provide effective protection if insurance companies fail. In the area of motor 
vehicle insurance in most EC Member States a guarantee fund operates. This fund is 
financed by levies on all insurance companies offering automobile insurance. The fund 
will pay compensation to injured traffic participants, among others in case of 
bankruptcy of the insurance company. This guarantee fund adequately protects the 
policy holder in the event of insolvency without strict, distorting regulations on 
premiums. This method allows competition in the market and also allows bankruptcy to 
occur. Losses in efficiency, which would be caused by the inapplicability of 
competition rules and bankruptcy law, are thus prevented. Moreover, the existence of 
minimum capital requirements and solvency margins should again be stressed. Hence, 
the insolvency argument is no excuse for cartel agreements on premiums between 
insurers. 
In sum, the conditions for the exemption from the cartel prohibition are not fulfilled in 
general. One should rather examine whether in individual cases there are arguments to 
exempt certain agreements in a specified insurance sector from the cartel prohibition. 
Therefore we believe that individual exemptions for certain agreements are less 
inefficient than the generalized exemption for all insurance branches and all kinds of 
agreements, as has been promulgated by the European Commission in the Regulation 
under discussion. 
In sum, there seem to be very few reasons not to apply competition law to the insurance 
branch. Nevertheless, the European Commission granted a group exemption on 21 
December 1992 for cartel agreements in the insurance branch. The structure and the text 
of Regulation 3932/92 make clear that the arguments discussed above certainly have 
 
 
21. See the opinion of Advocate General Darman in Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer [1987] ECR 
447 et seq. (no. 21 of the Opinion). 
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influenced the opinion of the European Commission.22 The problem is that the contents 
of the exemption seems to reach further than what could be justified for the efficient 
functioning of the insurance market. Before analyzing what the possible negative effects 
of the exemption may be on liability insurance (see below § 5), we will look at some of 
the still occurring practices of co-operation in the insurance world and relate them to the 
group exemption.  
§ 4. Regulation no. 3932/92 and some Practices on the Liability 
Insurance Market 
A. AGREEMENTS ON PREMIUMS 
The most far reaching form of a restriction on competition is outright price fixing. 
Today this practice is probably rare in the European liability insurance market. In some 
countries advice is given by insurers associations, e.g. on the way individual insurance 
companies could apply the tarification. In this respect, one can refer to the system of 
experience rating applied in motor vehicle liability insurance, referred to as the bonus 
malus system. As a result of this system, the experience rating in motor vehicle liability 
insurance is in many countries standardized. However, this bonus malus system in most 
countries only applies to tarification after the accident and is usually not binding. The 
system can well be considered as a relatively low cost efficient system of adapting the 
insurance premium to the individual behaviour of the insured. Moreover, in most 
systems the individual insurance company is totally free to apply a malus after an 
accident or not. In addition, the individual insurer is also free in fixing the initial 
premium.  
The same could be said as far as another practice is concerned, namely the use of 
standard form policies. For instance in the Netherlands the Dutch insurers association23 
provides a standard form policy for liability insurance for companies.24 These policy 
models usually contain a few provisions concerning the way in which the premium can 
be calculated, the payment of the premium and the possibilities for the insurer to adapt 
the premium, but these are left blank in the standard policy form. 
Article 3 of Regulation 3932/92 provides that the exemption shall apply on the 
condition that the calculations, tables or study results are purely illustrative and that 
they do not include in any way loadings for contingencies, income deriving from 
reserves, administrative or commercial costs. In other words: the tables and co-
 
 
22. For a comment on this regulation see G. Levi and H. Cousy (eds.), La politique Européenne de 
concurrence en matière d’assurance, (Bruylant, 1994). 
23. Verbond van Verzekeraars. 
24. De aansprakelijkheidsverzekering bedrijven (AVB) policy model 1996, published in 4 
Aansprakelijkheid en Verzekering 6 (1996), 151-160. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
292 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
operation are only possible concerning the calculation of the average cost of risk cover 
(the so-called pure premiums). Obviously one could argue that it is only a small step 
from co-operation concerning pure premiums toward pure price fixing. In order to avoid 
that risk, a strict control by competition authorities remains important. 
B. STANDARD FORM POLICIES 
As we just indicated, the co-operation between insurance companies often takes the 
form of a standard form policy model. Many countries use standard form models 
launched usually by national insurers associations, e.g. for motor vehicle liability 
insurance. The crucial question is again whether it is acceptable (or in economic terms 
efficient) that an insurers’ association undertakes research e.g. on the optimal method of 
coverage and passes on this information to its members in the form of a standard policy 
form.  
Again, the answer of the group exemption is relatively simple. Article 6 of Regulation 
provides that the exemption shall apply on condition that the standard policy conditions 
are established and distributed with an explicit statement that they are purely illustrative 
and expressly mention the possibility that different conditions may be agreed upon. 
Finally, these standard policy conditions should also be accessible to any interested 
person and provided simply on request. The standard policy forms applied e.g. in the 
Netherlands certainly meet that test. For instance in the Netherlands a new liability 
insurance model for enterprises was introduced in 1996. It was certainly made 
accessible to any interested person (it was even published in a liability law journal) and 
the standard form policy itself clearly indicates that the provisions are purely illustrative 
and that every individual insurer is allowed to apply different conditions. Also the 
Dutch literature stresses that this model is purely illustrative and that therefore the 
insurer is free to apply different conditions.25 
Again, one can hold that from a purely legal point of view this practice of standard form 
policies is allowed under the group exemption and therefore unproblematic. However, 
referring to the criticisms formulated above, one can again ask the question whether 
such a standardizing, under the argument of market transparency, should always be 
allowed. It cannot be denied that such a standard policy form definitely has the effect of 
restricting competition. Taking the example of the Netherlands, one can argue that the 
policy conditions e.g. provided in the liability insurance model for enterprises of 1996 
are on paper purely illustrative and that every insurer is therefore free to agree upon 
different conditions; but in practice this never happens. As a consequence, it will be 
impossible e.g. today for an employer in the Netherlands to obtain coverage for 
 
 
25. See for instance O.A. Haazen and J. Spier, ‘Amerikaanse toestanden en de nieuwe 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor bedrijven en beroepen’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2 (1996), 45. 
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employers liability on a loss occurrence basis, even if he were prepared to pay the 
corresponding premium, simply because the new standard form policy now has changed 
the system of coverage to claims made.  
As a matter of principle, the question remains why the European Commission uses 
competition law to guarantee transparency of policy conditions. The law of obligations 
and contract law rules, which guarantee the consumer clear standard form policy 
conditions, could far better serve the goal of market transparency. However, these 
critical comments of law and economics scholars will hardly pose any problem for 
Dutch (and other) insurers that use standard policy conditions. As long as they comply 
with Article 6 of Regulation no. 3932/92 they are allowed under EC competition law. 
C. POOLING 
As we argued above, co-operation between insurers is often justified by the argument 
that a huge capacity is necessary to be able to cover either complex or very ‘expensive’ 
risks. Pooling of risks is therefore a well-known phenomenon in the European insurance 
world to cover high risk activities. For instance the environmental risk is covered in 
many countries on the basis of pooling. Pooling is also used very often for the coverage 
of the nuclear risk. Although pooling is definitely a useful instrument to increase the 
capacity of insurance markets, it was equally indicated above that the necessity to pool 
risks should not as such justify an exemption from the cartel prohibition. 
Also the European Commission seems relatively careful as far as the allowing of 
pooling is concerned. It is therefore held in Article 11 that the advantages of the 
exemption no longer apply if in the case of coinsurance groups, the participating 
insurance undertakings represent more than 10% of all the insurance products that are 
identical or regarded as similar from the point of view of the risks covered. In case of co 
reinsurance, this is the case if the participating insurance undertakings represent more 
than 15% of all the insurance products. 
However, it is held in Article 11, second paragraph, that these percentages do not apply 
where the group covers catastrophic risks where the claims are both rare and large and 
in case of aggravated risks which involve a higher probability of claims because of the 
characteristics of the risks insured. However, the latter derogation is subject to the 
condition that none of the concerned undertakings shall participate in another group that 
covers risks on the same market and still it is held that with respect to groups which 
cover aggravated risks, the insurance products brought into the group may not represent 
more than 15% of all products.  
The question of course arises how this applies to the nuclear insurance market. Indeed, 
in most Member States the nuclear risk is covered by the so-called nuclear pools, which 
basically act as monopolies and which do not allow for any competition. Since 
Regulation 3932/92 does not seem to allow for any exception for the nuclear risk, the 
question arises how the nuclear insurance pools can deal with the requirement in Article 
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11 of the Regulation that the market share of the whole group may not be higher than 
15%. It seems that if this condition has not been met (which will be the case for most of 
the nuclear insurance pools) the pools principally fall under the cartel prohibition. 
This, by the way, also seems justified. Indeed, it was already argued above that although 
pooling of risks is as such to be considered as an efficient instrument allowing smaller 
insurance undertakings to participate also in the coverage of catastrophic risks, pooling 
is only justified under this assumption that it leads to increased competition. Indeed, 
without pooling one could argue that only larger companies could provide insurance 
coverage for catastrophical risks and that without pooling competition would therefore 
be too limited. If, on the other hand, pooling results in fact in a very high concentration 
on insurance markets, which seems to be the case with the insurance of the nuclear risk, 
the end result is obviously not efficient.  
D. BINDING DECISIONS 
In some countries, for instance in the Netherlands, it was also customary for insurers’ 
associations to issue so-called binding decisions to the whole insurance market. This 
happened especially with regard to the consequences of natural disasters, such as the 
flood risks and earthquakes. Dutch insurers believed in the 1950s that they were 
confronted with huge difficulties in the coverage of those risks, so they decided not to 
cover these risks any longer. This uninsurability thus was the result of a so-called 
binding decision of the insurers’ association guiding all the members and instructing 
them not to cover those risks. 
From the point of view of insurability, the problem with these kind of agreements is of 
course that they are based on a judgment concerning the insurability of e.g. flood risks, 
whereas the uninsurability is de facto only the result of the cartel agreement of the 
insurers not to cover those particular risks. The result of those binding decisions was 
that no insurer in the Netherlands wished to cover the consequences of natural disasters. 
It is obvious that a cartel agreement of insurers collectively not to insure particular risks 
may be potentially socially damaging. The consequence is indeed that public 
interventions (e.g. collective compensation funds) will have to intervene, also for those 
forms of damage which are technically speaking insurable.  
An agreement between insurance companies not to cover certain risks can never benefit 
from the exemption of the cartel prohibition on the basis of Regulation 3932/92. 
Consideration 8 preceding the regulation explicitly states: 
Standard policy conditions may in particular not contain any systematic 
exclusion of specific types of risk without providing for the express 
possibility of including that cover by agreement and may not provide for 
the contractual relationship with the policy holder to be maintained for an 
excessive period or go beyond the initial object to the policy. 
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The same requirement can be found in Article 7 (1) (a) which provides that the 
exemption shall not be applied where the standard policy conditions exclude certain 
risks from the cover, without indicating explicitly that each insurer remains free to 
extend the cover to such events.  
The simple conclusion seems therefore to be that the so-called binding decisions, 
whereby an insurer’s association more or less prohibits its associated insurance 
undertakings to cover certain risks violate competition law and cannot be exempted 
under Regulation 3932/92. 
§ 5. The Group Exemption and the Efficiency Goals of Liability Law 
In section 2 of this paper we explained why competition on insurance markets is 
important for the proper functioning of an efficient accident law. In case of restrictive 
practices it is to be feared that less differentiated insurance policies will be offered on 
the market, with less product differentiation as a result. This restricted risk 
differentiation may in turn lead to an insufficient control of moral hazard and hence 
increase the accident risk. The exchange of information between insurers could also 
create a framework which may be abused and result in price fixing. This again could 
mean that premiums are not optimally aligned to the insured risks. A further 
consequence of restrictive practices may be that the government becomes dependent on 
larger insurance undertakings or pools, which may be inclined to provide improper 
information on the insurability of certain risks. Taking into account these potentially 
negative consequences as far as the efficiency goals of accident law are concerned, it 
seems important to stress once more that insurance markets should remain sufficiently 
competitive to optimally reduce accident risks.  
A. TOO LOW PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND INCREASED ACCIDENT RISK 
A well-known consequence of concentration on markets is an increase in prices. The 
same is of course true for insurance markets. Research by Finsinger has shown in 
countries with a high degree of government regulation and concentration on the 
insurance market premiums are on average 117% higher than in countries with less 
regulation and more competitive insurance markets.26 Also the Price Waterhouse report 
on ‘The costs of non Europe in financial services’ demonstrated that, again dependent 
upon the type of insurance under discussion, premiums in competitive insurance 
markets are considerably lower than premiums in highly regulated markets.27  
 
 
26. J. Finsinger and F.A. Schmidt, Prices, Distribution channels and regulatory intervention in European 
insurance markets, Working paper, University of Vienna, Business Economics Institute, (1992). 
27. Price Waterhouse, ‘The costs of non Europe’, in Financial Services, Brussels, EC Commission, (1988). 
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A further problem resulting from restraints on competition is that insurers will have 
insufficient incentives to provide a large variety of individualized insurance policies.28 
This may again be illustrated with empirical evidence. It was shown that the variety of 
insurance policies is much larger on the competitive British market than on the 
concentrated German market.29 If premiums are fixed, one would at first sight expect 
that insurers would focus more on non-price competition and would therefore offer a 
wider variety of policies. However, in order to exclude non-price competition, cartel 
agreements, premium regulation and standardized insurance policies are combined. In 
the end, only inefficient instruments of non-price competition, such as aggressive 
advertising remain.  
In the economic analysis of accident law liability rules are seen as instruments to 
achieve a reduction of accident costs.30 These rules should give incentives to potential 
injurers to behave carefully (i.e. to take efficient care) and not to engage in dangerous 
activities in an excessive way (i.e. to adopt an optimal activity level). If the losses are 
not borne by the injurer himself but shifted to an insurance company, the latter should 
take over the deterrent function of liability rules.  
On a competitive insurance market the deterrent function of liability rules remains 
unaffected. The reason is that moral hazard will be controlled in an optimal way. 
Competitive pressures will indeed lead the insurers to provide an optimal adaptation of 
premiums or policy conditions to the behaviour of the individual insured.31 Therefore, 
competition law should complement liability rules in preserving their deterrent function. 
Effective competition ensures that premiums and policy conditions relate to the 
individual behaviour of the insured and that moral hazard is reduced as far as possible.32 
Competitive insurance markets will thus enable a narrowing of risk pools, which is 
crucial to avoid the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection.33 To overcome the 
dangers following from moral hazard and adverse selection and in particular to 
guarantee the insurability of the risks, product variety on the insurance market is 
indispensable. This implies a wide gamut of policies. We have indicated above that this 
will, on the one hand, enable risk-averse individuals to maximize their utility by 
 
 
28. See M. Adams, Ökonomische Analyse der Gefährdungs- und Verschuldenshaftung, (R. v. Decker’s 
Verlag, 1985), 215-216 and H.E. Frech and J. Samprone, 23 Journal of Law and Economics 2 (1980), 
429-440. 
29. J. Finsinger, E. Hammond and J. Tapp, Insurance: competition or regulation?, A comparative study of 
the insurance markets in the United Kingdom and the federal republic of Germany. 
30. S. Shavell, Economic analysis of accident law, (Harvard University Press, 1987). 
31. See Adams, Ökonomische Analyse der Gefärdungs- und Verschuldenshaftung, 232-233; K. Arrow, 
‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’, 53 American Economic Review 5 (1963), 
941-973; M. Pauly, ‘The Economics of moral Hazard’, 58 American Economic Review 3 (1968), 531-
537. 
32. Adams, Ökonomische Analyse der Gefärdungs- und Verschuldenshaftung, 237. 
33. See G. Priest, ‘The current insurance crisis and modern tort law’, 96 Yale Law Journal 7 (1987), 1521-
1590. 
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purchasing insurance coverage corresponding with their demand for insurance, and on 
the other hand, will lead to an optimal control of moral hazard.  
The arguments above clarify the importance of competition for preserving the deterrent 
function of liability rules. In concentrated markets insurance companies have too little 
incentive to offer individualized policies. Therefore, premiums will not reflect the 
behaviour of the insured and there will be no optimal control of moral hazard.  
Empirical research has shown, particularly with respect to motor vehicle insurance, that 
a high degree of concentration on the market may indeed have negative effects. For 
instance in Germany the degree of differentiation of policies and the individualization 
of the risk is much lower than in the United Kingdom. According to Adams, the high 
degree of concentration in the German insurance markets, combined with German 
insurance regulation, provided too few incentives for the insurers to control the 
behaviour of their insured. Adams claims that this has led to a significant increase in the 
number of fatal car accidents in Germany.34 This leads to a worrisome conclusion: with 
too little competition on the insurance market, standardization of policy conditions and 
too little risk differentiation there will not be a strong enough incentive for insurance 
companies to control moral hazard, which might lead to a higher accident rate. It may 
be questioned whether the European Commission fully realizes that competition is an 
absolutely necessary condition for the efficient functioning of insurance markets. If 
cartel agreements impair the efficient functioning of insurance markets, this can in the 
end lead to an increase of the accident risk.  
B. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL DANGERS 
The Block Exemption confirms the benefits of a collaboration between insurance 
undertakings concerning the exchange of information. Consideration 6 preceding the 
exemption regulation provides in that respect: 
Collaboration between insurance undertakings or within associations of 
undertakings in the compilation of statistics on the number of claims, the 
number of individual risks insured, total amounts paid in respect of claims 
and the amount of capital insured makes it possible to improve the 
knowledge of risks and facilitates the rating of risks for individual 
companies (…). Joint studies on the probable impact of extraneous 
circumstances that may influence the frequency or scale of claims, or the 
yield of different types of investments, should also be included. It is, 
however, necessary to ensure that restrictions are only exempted to the 
extent to which they are necessary to attain these objectives. 
 
 
34. Adams, Ökonomische Analyse der Gefärdungs- und Verschuldenshaftung, 246-254. 
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From the perspective of an insurer executing joint research with respect to the 
insurability of certain risks can obviously result in important advantages of scale. For 
instance, duplication of costs can be avoided if not every separate insurer asks health 
experts to examine what, within the framework of employer’s liability, is the risk that 
insurers will be confronted with claims based on new occupational diseases. In this 
respect, important cost savings can be achieved thanks to co-ordinating work by an 
insurers’ association. One could think of an arrangement whereby the insurers’ 
association undertakes the joint research (thus benefiting from the scale advantages) and 
would pass on information to insurers on which occupational diseases may in the future 
lead to employer’s liability in specific sectors. This information can then allow 
individual insurers to determine which employers may be the good or the bad risks and 
on the basis of this information risk groups can be constituted. Hence, the joint initiative 
can provide useful information for an optimal risk differentiation by insurers and at the 
same time it can serve a social interest. Above it was explained that only when an 
insurer is able to respond adequately to the real risks (via an optimal differentiation of 
risks) can insurance play its socially important function of prevention of accidents in an 
optimal manner. 
As far as gathering information on factors which may influence risks a co-operation 
between insurers can therefore be important. The goal of this information is to obtain 
information which will allow individual insurers to define individual risk groups as 
narrowly as possible. Thus they can provide adequate remedies to moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Therefore one can understand that this type of joint research is 
allowed by the group exemption. Still, the various individual insurers can use the 
available information each in their own way to offer attractive policy conditions on the 
market. Hence, the available information can still be used as a tool of competition and 
can hence increase the competitiveness of the market. 
Nevertheless, it always remains important to be cautious and to listen to the wise advice 
of Adam Smith. By allowing an information exchange on a large scale, the European 
Commission in fact provides an open invitation to insurers for the type of meetings that 
Adam Smith feared because they are potentially restrictive for competition. Therefore, 
competition authorities will always have to be cautious and check that insurers who on 
the one hand engage in exchange of information on accident frequency and pure 
premiums are not also seduced afterwards to make a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with 
respect to gross premiums. The latter agreements limit premium competition and hence 
endanger the efficiency goals of accident law. If one can avoid the latter risk then a co-
operation and exchange of information may go hand in hand with competition 
concerning premiums and policy conditions. 
C. UNRELIABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING INSURABILITY 
There is another major disadvantage of high concentration on insurance markets. The 
government may become dependent on the insurance market for the provision of 
information on insurability. From the moment that there is a high concentration on 
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insurance markets, it appears to be extremely difficult to obtain reliable information on 
insurability in general, but more particularly on the capacity, from the insurance market.  
Private interest theories of regulation have predicted that well organized industrial 
sectors (e.g. in a cartel) have low transaction costs on the market for regulation and their 
potential success in the field of lobbying may be large. This justifies the question 
whether the extent of liability should be judged on the basis of information provided by 
monopolistic insurers concerning insurance possibilities. If the argument that liability 
should be ‘insurable’ is taken seriously, it is obviously of great importance for the 
policy maker to require reliable information on the actual insurability of certain risks. 
Precisely for that goal a well-functioning competitive market is of importance, so that 
the policy maker can inquire with several companies what the precise possibilities of 
insurance coverage are.  
Experience with nuclear liability insurance has revealed that the information provided 
may be unreliable if the policy maker becomes completely dependent upon information 
provided by a monopolistic insurer. Take the example of nuclear insurance which, as 
mentioned before, is dominated in every country by the so-called nuclear pools. In the 
Netherlands the Dutch government relied almost blindly on information provided by the 
Dutch nuclear pool on the availability of coverage for liability insurance when fixing 
the liability limit in the Dutch Act on Nuclear Liability of 26 June 1991.35 Minister Kok 
declared during the parliamentary debate that ‘during the whole preparation of the draft 
negotiations have taken place with the nuclear pool. In all cases the nuclear pool could 
agree with the proposals. There has hence been an optimal involvement of the sector’.36 
Critical voices have asked the question whether the liability limit for the licensee of a 
nuclear power plant had to be set at the amount of 500 million Dutch guilders and 
should not be tested periodically according to the increasing possibilities of coverage on 
the private insurance market,37 but the availability of insurance remained fully based on 
information provided by the nuclear pool.38  
The fact that the policy maker often relies on information provided by monopolistic 
insurers to judge the capacity of the insurance market is obviously not merely a Dutch 
phenomenon. Precisely the same took place when the Belgian Act of 22 July 198539 
concerning the liability of the licensee of a nuclear plant was discussed in parliament. 
 
 
35. Staatsblad 1991, no. 369 and no. 373. 
36. Parliamentary Documents, Second Chamber of Parliament, 23 April 1991, 72-4061. 
37. See in this respect among others the critical questions by Van Rijn-Vellekoop, Second Chamber of 
Parliament, 23 April 1991, 72-4046 and of the De Korte, Second Chamber of Parliament, 23 April 
1991, 72-4052. 
38. For further details see M. Faure, ‘De verzekering van het nucleaire risico’, in H.A. Bouwman and 
A.J.O. van Wassenaar van Catwijck, In volle verzekerdheid, Essays offered to Prof. Mr. A.J.O. Van 
Wassenaer van Catwijck, (Tjeenk Willink, 1993), 241-254. 
39. Belgisch Staatsblad 31 August 1985. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
300 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
Also in Belgium the government contacted the Belgian nuclear pool, Syban, with the 
question whether an amount of more than 4 billion Belgian Francs would be available 
for third party liability coverage. Syban, the nuclear pool in Belgium, fiercely denied 
this. Later it turned out that the nuclear power plant itself is insured in first party 
insurance (property insurance) for an amount of more than 40 billion Belgian Francs. It 
is obviously relatively unclear why the nuclear pool only had an amount available for 
third party liability insurance of 4 billion Belgian francs, whereas the damage to the 
nuclear installation itself could apparently be insured for 40 billion Belgian Francs.40 
This Belgian act has, by the way, recently been changed, since the parliament accepted 
a legislative proposal (launched by two ‘green’ ministers) to increase the amount of the 
licensee of a nuclear power plant to 12 billion Belgian Francs.41 But that obviously does 
not change the points made here: again the amount was based on the insurability 
according to insurers. 
These nuclear examples show that one should be careful with judging the ‘insurability’ 
of a particular risk, more particularly concerning the capacity aspect, on the basis of 
information provided by insurers, at least when there is a high degree of concentration 
on this insurance market. It is striking that with respect to the nuclear insurance all 
national pools do not compete (in order to increase the capacity) but again co-operate. 
The national nuclear pools indeed only insure the nuclear installations on their own 
territory, so that there is no competition between these pools. This example shows, once 
more, that in the nuclear case the pooling takes the restrictions of competition further 
than would be necessary to increase the insurability of the nuclear liability risk.  
The discussion above has shown that one has to be very careful with the argument that 
capacity may be limited. The policy recommendation is to allow co-operation between 
insurers on the condition that it increases competition, which is precisely the spirit of 
the report of the European Commission of 12 May 1999 on the operation of Regulation 
3932/92.  
§ 6. Report of the Commission to the Parliament and to the Council of 
12 May 1999 
In 1999 the European Commission drafted a report directed to the European parliament 
and to the Council on the operation of Commission Regulation no. 3932/92 concerning 
 
 
40. For a critical analysis see also M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh, 10 International Review of Law and 
Economics 1 (1990), 241-254. 
41. See Parliamentary Documents, Belgian House of Representatives, Doc 1999/2000, 50 0560/001, of 3 
April 2000. The act has meanwhile been passed and has become the Act of 11 July 2000, Moniteur 
Belge, 4 October 2000. For a comment see T. Vanden Borre, ‘Recente ontwikkelingen in het nucleaire 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht: innovatie of renovatie?’, Milieu- en Energierecht (2000), 25-49 and T. 
Vanden Borre, Efficiënte preventie en compensatie van catastroferisico’s. Het voorbeeld van schade 
door kernongevallen, (Intersentia, 2001), 323-326. 
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the application of Article 81, (3) of the EC Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices in the field of insurance. The purpose of this report 
was to make clear in which way the Regulation has been applied and to discuss 
proposals for amendment. The report is particularly interesting since it makes clear in 
which way the Regulation has been applied in legal practice so far and what criteria the 
European Commission used to judge whether certain practices could benefit from the 
exemption or not. Of course it is not possible within the scope of this contribution to 
discuss this report in detail; there are however various aspects that certainly merit 
discussion.42 
A. CO-OPERATION AS FAR AS PREMIUMS ARE CONCERNED 
In the first place the Commission discussed the well-known exemption concerning co-
operation with respect to pure premiums and claims statistics. The Commission stressed 
again that it was important that the co-operation should be limited to what was really 
necessary to be able to fix pure premiums. The question of to what extent an insurer 
needs really to co-operate with its competitors as regards calculation of premiums 
would, according to the Commission, also depend on its size. In this respect, the 
Commission did not rule out that a large insurer might on its own have a sufficient size 
to cover sufficient similar risks to obtain reliable statistical data.43 As far as practical 
experience is concerned, the Commission among others discussed a case involving the 
Belgian professional association of insurance companies (UPEA). This professional 
association had established a minimum pure premium for the coverage of hospital 
expenses in the case of group contracts. The Commission established that there was 
nothing to indicate that this recommendation was based on statistical data and hence the 
Commission concluded that this recommendation was not in conformity with the 
exemption.44 In general, one can notice that the Commission was extremely careful as 
far as the necessity of co-operation in the field of premium calculation is concerned. At 
various instances, the Commission repeated, also when discussing future prospects, that 
this co-operation should be limited to the necessary data collection which is needed 
from a statistical point of view to calculate the premium. Hence, the Commission 
clearly held that if insurers depart from the joint calculations of the average pure 
premium, the Commission would judge if the agreement in question restricted 
competition in an appreciable way.45 Within these relatively small margins co-operation 
between insurance undertakings remains possible. This co-operation does not seem to 
pose any problem as far as it merely concerns an exchange of information and no co-
operation as far as premiums is concerned.  
 
 
42. See COM(1999) 142 final of 12 May 1999. 
43. See Report, no. 6, 4. 
44. Report, no. 9, 5. 
45. Report, no. 12, 7. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
302 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
B. AGAIN: THE BINDING DECISIONS 
Probably more interesting are the considerations in the Commission’s report concerning 
standard form policies. The European Commission dealt extensively with the so-called 
binding decisions, which were applied by the Dutch insurers’ association. The Dutch 
insurers had argued that they should be allowed to exclude flood risks by common 
agreement since flood risks were said to be uninsurable in the Netherlands. Therefore 
the national organization of insurers had decided to prevent insurers from offering cover 
for the particular risks. The Commission’s services rightly queried why there was any 
need for such a decision if insurers considered the risk to be uninsurable anyway. In that 
respect, one could indeed argue also that an individual insurer could come to the insight 
that the risk was uninsurable.  
The Commission reported that in the end the Dutch insurer’s association brought its 
binding decision into line with Article 7.1 sub a by simply converting it into a non-
binding recommendation, leaving each insurer free to extend cover to flood risks.46 
Therefore, the problem of the Dutch binding decisions seems to be solved, at least as far 
as the flood risks are concerned. 
C. WHAT ABOUT POOLING? 
The Commission also dealt extensively with the issue of pooling. The issue of pooling 
has also been discussed by the European Commission in its already mentioned report to 
the European Parliament and to the Council of 12 May 1999 concerning the operation 
of Regulation 3932/92. The Commission clearly discussed the common coverage of 
certain risks, which we have referred to here as ‘pooling’. The Commission stated that 
the starting point remained that any institutionalized grouping is in itself restrictive of 
competition. However, a pool can benefit from the block exemption if the market share 
of its members does not exceed the thresholds as specified in the exemption 
regulation.47 The Commission however remained flexible and recognized that in some 
areas of insurance an insurer must, in order to be present on a market without incurring 
excessive risk, insure a sufficient number of risks so that the risk profile of its portfolio 
corresponds to the average for the totality of risks in the category. The Commission 
continued: 
There therefore needs to be a strong probability that the real level of 
claims incurred by the insurer will be the same as the average level of 
claims of all insurers. This strong probability can only be obtained above 
a certain number of risks covered by the insurer. Certain catastrophic 
 
 
46. See report, no. 18, 9. 
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risks may be such that no individual insurer is capable of insuring it 
alone. In such a case, the pooling of capacity does not restrict 
competition. If anything, the pool strengthened competition since it 
allows several insurers who are unable alone to provide cover for the risk 
at hand to put their resources in common and create a new competitor for 
the benefit of customers in need of such cover. 
The Commission further found: 
In any event, the Commission will consider that pools no matter how high 
their market share is, are not covered by article 81-1 (ex-article 85-1) 
when they are necessary to allow their members to provide a type of 
insurance they could not provide alone.48 
This probably may save nuclear and other pools who could argue that (no matter how 
high their market share is) they are necessary since without a pool this type of insurance 
for these risks could otherwise not be provided.  
The European Commission also discussed the perspectives for the future and announced 
that its services have just launched their investigation into ‘co-insurance or co-
reinsurance pools dealing with environmental risks and nuclear risks. Several of those 
pools have been notified (The French environmental pool Assurpol was actually granted 
an exemption in 1991. This exemption expired last year). All these pools will be 
assessed in the light of the tier legality test spelled out above’.49 
In other words, there is to be expected more news from the competition authorities of 
the European Commission with respect to the legality of the co-operation within 
environmental and nuclear pools.  
As far as pooling is concerned it is, moreover, interesting to notice that the European 
Commission once more has shown itself extremely flexible towards the so-called 
Protection and Indemnity clubs (P&I Clubs). These clubs engage in the coverage of 
(among others) damage caused by marine oil pollution.50 On 16 December 1985 the 
Commission had already decided that these P&I clubs should be granted an exemption 
on the basis of the old Article 85, (3) of the EC Treaty. It was argued in the literature 
that it is doubtful that the conditions for such an exemption for the P&I clubs were 
 
 
48. Report, no. 28 (B). 
49. See report, no. 32. 
50. See M. Faure and G. Heine, ‘The insurance of fines: the case of oil pollution’, 16 The Geneva Papers 
on Risk and Insurance 58 (1991), 39-54. 
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance 
304 9 MJ 3 (2002) 
fulfilled.51 These arguments apparently have not convinced the European Commission. 
Indeed, in the report the Commission again showed a great amount of latitude towards 
the P&I clubs. It is argued that the co-operation between the P&I clubs is necessary to 
allow its members to offer the level of cover they now offer. This is remarkable in the 
light of the fact that the Commission at the same time established that the Protection and 
Indemnity clubs cover about 89% of the world market for maritime contractual and 
third party liability insurance.52 
D. INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS ALLOWED 
Finally, it is important to repeat that agreements that remain limited to the exchange of 
information concerning risks are still exempted from the cartel prohibition. This was 
already clear from the Consideration 6 preceding the Regulation, which was quoted 
above. In the report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the operation of 
Regulation 3932/92, the Commission also examined whether systems of keeping 
registers or exchanging information on aggravated risks were allowed from a 
competition policy perspective. The Commission held53 that these agreements on 
keeping registers or exchanging information had the aim of making it possible for 
insurers to know better the nature of the risks to be insured. These agreements do not 
fall formally within Article 81 (1) (ex-Article 85 (1)) of the EC Treaty if they restrict 
themselves to giving information on aggravated risks. In any case, the Commission held 
that a simple exchange of information on the nature of a risk does not appear to have the 
aim of restricting competition between insurers. However, the European Commission 
was careful and argued that it was different if the exchange of information was 
accompanied by an agreement aiming to adopt a common attitude with regard to the 
risk in question. For example, recommendations to refuse to cover the aggravated risks 
in question or to raise the risk premiums for these risks fall clearly within the scope of 
Article 81 (1) (ex-Article 85 (1)) and do not appear exempt under the terms of Article 
81 (3) (ex-Article 85 (3)), so the report reads. 
This report thus clearly states that also from a European competition policy perspective 
an exchange of information on risk between insurers is allowed – at least in Europe – in 
order to increase the availability of reliable statistics and data. At the same time the 
limits of such a co-operation are made clear as well: exchanging information is allowed, 
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formulating recommendations to refuse coverage or to raise risk premiums obviously 
not.54 
§ 7. Concluding Remarks 
After the publication of Regulation no. 3932/92 critical comments have been formulated 
in the literature on exempting insurance undertakings from the cartel prohibition. These 
warnings still remain valid. In this contribution, we argued that competition on 
insurance markets remains essential as a condition for an efficient functioning of 
accident law. If that basic notion is lost from sight this may not only lead to a premium 
increase, but also to adverse effects in terms of accident prevention. In this respect one 
can recall the risk of one-sided information on insurability, too little risk differentiation 
and, as a result of this all, an increase of the accident risk. It is certainly not to be argued 
that in all European insurance markets this would, empirically, be a real danger. 
However, it remains important to point to the importance of competition on insurance 
markets. This can avoid one simply neglecting the possible negative effects of 
restrictions on competition markets for accident law in general. 
Many forms of co-operation between insurance companies on the European market now 
take the form of either an exchange of information or recommendations from national 
associations of insurance undertakings. Some of these recommendations, e.g. to move 
from loss occurrence to claims made coverage, follow the advice insurance economists 
would otherwise give insurers as well and can therefore hardly be criticized as such. 
However, it remains important that these recommendations should in practice remain 
non binding. That would mean that if an insured individual would wish to obtain 
coverage e.g. for employer’s liability on the basis of loss occurrence coverage, this 
should still be possible. If, however, the co-operation becomes such that certain types of 
coverage are effectively no longer offered on the market, then a recommendation leads 
to a too limited product differentiation and therefore to inefficiencies.  
However, a co-operation between insurance companies can have important beneficial 
effects as well. An important asset of this co-operation is that it allows the provision of 
information e.g. on the elements that influence the risk. When information gathering by 
an insurers’ association takes place, this can lead to scale economies and thus to welfare 
gains. These could in turn lead to even a widening of the supply of insurance products. 
However, the well known warning of Adam Smith that when entrepreneurs meet they 
will seldom be able to resist the challenge to make agreements that are not in the public 
interest remains valid even in the 21st century. The European Commission also is fully 
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aware of this. Information exchange is clearly allowed; taking the same attitude towards 
the coverage of risks clearly not. Thus it should be possible to enjoy the benefits of co-
operation (such as the economies of scale in gathering information) without having the 
dangers and disadvantages. Still the competition authorities will always have to make 
sure that this dangerous balance remains maintained.  
As far as catastrophic risks are concerned, further news can be expected from the 
European Commission. One can hope that the European Commission does not too 
rapidly accept the argument that a total exclusion of competition is necessary to be able 
to offer coverage of catastrophic risk. Even when pooling is considered necessary, such 
as in the case of the nuclear risk, this should of course not lead to an exclusive insurance 
by national insurance pools (such as is the case today), but to a European or national 
market with competing nuclear insurance pools. Only if there is effective competition 
between the national pools (which is not at all the case today) can one expect that the 
offer on the nuclear insurance market will be increased.  
The discussion on competition on insurance markets also shows that competition should 
not necessarily be considered as a negative aspect for the insurance sector, but rather 
more as a challenge. The insurer who, for instance with the help of specialization, can 
obtain better information on the good and the bad risks and on the effective preventive 
measures would be able to offer attractive policy conditions to the good risks. 
Information can thus become an attractive instrument of competition. If insurers see 
these challenges and possibilities for a competitive European insurance market, they 
will be able to increase and strengthen their market position by attracting good risks. In 
the end, this should result in insurance markets which will allow tort law and accident 
law in general to be able to fulfil its function of the minimization of accident costs. 
